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PUBLIC SCHOOLS: SERRANO V. PRIEST-A
CHALLENGE TO KENTUCKY
Partiality and selectivity that favor any child at the expense of
another, or deny any youngster an opportunity available to his
neighbor have no longer any place in our schools. They never did,
in principle, but now we mean to bring our practices abreast of our
principles. And the task of reconciling practice with precept is the
central task of those who lead our schools.'

I. EQUAL PROTECTION

iN PROPERTY TAXATION

A. The TraditionalAnalysis
In Serrano v. Priest,2 the Supreme Court of California declared
that a system of financing schools, by a tax on property within the
school district, amounts to an unreasonable classification of tax revenue
and thus violates a taxpayer's right to equal protection of the laws.
In so construing the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, the court significantly departed from the traditional theory that
school financing arrangements are a matter of state prerogative. In
rejecting this basic view, the court determined that such a tax
system impinges on the fundamental right to education. The ramifications of this decision are nationwide as forty-eight more states finance
their public schools through similar means. 3 "At issue is the whole

structure of the financing of American education."4 For this reason,
traditional concepts must be examined and compared with the rationale
as presented in Serrano.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
federal constitution has become the determining factor in granting
federal review of state laws which classify the use of tax funds. As
early as 1890, the Supreme Court of the United States cautiously
recognized that there were perhaps constitutional limitations governing
the formation of discriminatory classification schemes. In Bells Gap v.
Pennsylvania,5 the Court indicated that if a tax employed . .. clear
' Fischer, Our Schools: Battleground of Conflicting Interests, reprinted as
foreword to ch. 5, J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALT3 AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
2 Serrano v. Priest, Cal. Repr. -,
P.2d
- (1971). At pub-

lication, the official citation was unavailable. A full reprint of the decision can be

found in URBAN AFFAIRS, A SPEcaL REPORT, September 2, 1971.

3 Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
4 Id.
5 134 U.S. 232 (1890).
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and hostile discrimination against persons and classes, the equal protection clause might be a constitutional bar, especially if the tax were
unusual in character and unknown to traditional government."
Although the limitation imposed was not particularly burdensome,
it did mark the introduction of the Supreme Court into federal review
of state tax matters. Prior to Bel's Gap a federal court in California
had previously set forth a basic standard for judging state tax classifications. The court there held that a classification devised to produce,
or which necessarily results in, gross inequality to those subject to
the tax is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. 7 This
position was echoed in the Bells Gap litigation. Neither this nor later
judicial pronouncements prohibited classification per se nor did they
demand "an iron rule of equal taxation" for all persons or property.8
Under this basic theory any classification which was not grossly unequal was permissible providing that the basis for classification had
a reasonable relation to an end that the state could constitutionally
seek.9 Traditionally, state courts have followed this standard by
upholding reasonable classifications. 10
Overall, the courts have tended to allow state legislatures considerable discretion in establishing classifications" so long as they
are relevant to a legitimate state goal. 1 2 The Supreme Court presumes
such classifications are based on adequate grounds. 13 In explaining
the basis for this presumption, the Court has indicated that it is not
its function to analyze the propriety of a tax classification or to
criticize the state's public policy that prompted an enactment. 14 As a
result, the Court has stated that in tax matters a state could classify
in a manner that exempts certain property from taxation; imposes
different taxes upon different trades and professions; varies the rate
on products; taxes real and personal property differently; and taxes
6 Id.at 237.
7 County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 18 Fed. 385 (C.C.D. Cal.
1883).
89 Bells Gap R. R. Co. v. Penn., 134 U.S. 232 (1890).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Watson v. State Comptroller,
254 U.S.
0 122 (1920).
1 Schrey v. Ablison Steel Mfg. Co., 255 P.2d 604 (Ariz. 1953); Freeman v.
City of Neligh 53 N.W.2d 67 (Neb. 1952); Watauga Valley Gas Co. v. Evans, 241
S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1951); Patterson v. Chattanooga, 241 S.W.2d 291 (Tenn.
1951); Dorrance v. Douglas County, 32 N.W.2d (Neb. 1948); Gratiot County
v. Federspiel, 20 N.W.2d 131 (Mich. 1945).
1 Madden v. Commonwealth, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
' 2 Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913); Jones v. Jones, 65 S.W.2d 460
(Ky. 1928).
:a Madden v. Commonwealth, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
14 Tax Comm'r v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931).
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visible property while exempting from taxation securities for payment
on money. 15
Due to this deference to state discretion and the presumption of
reasonableness of classification, anyone challenging a statute has the
burden of showing that it is "so lacking in any reasonable basis as to
be arbitrary"' In addition, this party must prove that any resulting
discrimination is not insubstantial 17 and that he personally is adversely
affected by the discrimination of which he complains.'
Thus a
classification does not impinge on the equal protection clause because
"it is not made with mathematical nicety or . . . results in some
inequality."19 It is because of this presumption of constitutionality,
and the burden of proof imposed on one challenging a state classification, that there has been little litigation seeking the invalidation of
state taxing systems. Perhaps the underlying reason is the recognition
by the Supreme Court that "the power of taxation is fundamental to
the very existence of the states."20 For these reasons the equal
protection clause has been invoked to strike down state levies in only
two specific areas: (1) intentional discrimination in assessments and
(2) discrimination against foreign corporations.&2
In matters other than tax classifications, however, the federal courts
have been more active in requiring state laws to comply with the
federal equal protection mandate. If a state enactment affects a right
that is deemed to be fundamental, a different standard has been
applied. Rather than deferring to the state's prerogatives by means
of a presumption of reasonableness in these areas, the Supreme Court
has "set in judgment upon the very purpose and on the objective
effect of legislation." 22 Where fundamental rights have been involved,
for example, in the school desegregation cases, 23 the reapportionment
decision, 24 the indigent and criminal justice cases 25 and the voting
15 Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v. Penn., 134 U.S. 232 (1890).
16 Borden's Farm Prod. Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936).
7 Dolley v. Abilene Natl Bank, 179 F. 461, (8th Cir. 1910), Aff'd 228 U.S.
1 (1913).
18Hess v. Mullaney, 213 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1954).
219
0 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).

Tax Commr v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931); Brown-Foreman Co. v. Ky.,
217 U.S. 563 (1910); Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114 (1910); Bells
Gap R.R. Co. v. Penn., 134 U.S. 232 (1890).
21 Legislative Reference Service, CONSTIrION

OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AmmwcA
1285 (1964).
22

Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional
Test for State FinancialStructures, 57 CALr. L. REV. 305 (1969).
2
3 Grifi v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
374 U.S. 483 (1954).
24 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
25 Tate v. Short, 39 U.S.L. Week 4301 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.

235 (1970); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S.
(Continued on next page)

1971]
NoTEs
159
27
rights cases,.2 the Court has subjected state laws to special scrutiny.
In these areas a state act will be permissable only if it is based on a
"compelling state interest" as a much narrower presumption of constitutionality will be employed. 28
In summary, whenever a court is faced with a challenged state
enactment, it uses a two level approach. First, it examines the nature
of the matter to determine whether it affects a fundamental or nonfundamental right. Then it applies the standard required by the
nature of the right involved. If the matter is of fundamental interest,
only a limited presumption of constitutionality is appropriate, and
the court will subject the matter to close scrutiny to ascertain whether
the state's action impinges on protected rights. However, if the matter
is nonfundamental, a heavy burden of proof is required to overcome
the presumption of constitutionality and the traditional deference to
state policy and discretion. Until Serrano, any taxpayer challenging
classifications designed to support public education would have to
satisfy this latter burden.
Serrano deemed education to be a matter of fundamental interest,
thus, under Serrano any classification relative to education will be
carefully examined to determine if a compelling state interest justifies
the financing scheme.
B. The Serrano Approach
The method of financing in Serranois similar to those of most other
states. 29 Basically, it empowers local governing bodies to levy taxes
on real property within a school district.30 The tax rate depends on
the assessed value of real property within the district and on the school
budget. Upon examination of these factors, the court in Serrano concluded that under this system the quality of a child's education was
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

738 (1967); Douglas v. Cal., 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S.
708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Gritffn v. Illinois, 351 U.S, 12
(1956).
26 McDonald v. Bd. of Educ., 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Harper v. Bd. of
Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
2
7 See, P. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: the Limits of Constitutional
28Juriprudence Undefined, 35 U. oF Cm. L. REV. 583 (1967-68).
McDonald v. Bd. of Educ., 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
29 The California court in applying the fourteenth amendment glossed over
the state action required to apply the equal protection clause. However, the court's
action is in keeping with the general approach to state action.
[T]he involvement of the state need not be exclusive or direct. In a
variety of situations the Court has found state action of a nature sufficient
to create rights under the Equal Protection Clause even though the
participation of the State was peripheral, or its action was only one of
severa cooperative forces leading to the constitutional violation.
United States v,Guest. 383 U.S. 745, 155-56 (1966).
10 West. Cal. Educ. Code § 20701 (West 1969).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

directly dependent upon the wealth of the district. The court then
proceeded on the basis of two major propositions: (1) any classification
based on wealth was a suspect classification which required the court
to subject the system to strict scrutiny. (2) The tax classification
directly affected education, a matter of fundamental interest to individuals and society. Applying these precepts, the court held that
because California failed to meet the burden of showing a compelling
state interest the taxing pattern was in violation of the equal protection
clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. In so holding, the
court rejected arguments of defendants that the classification should be
saved (1) because funds were applied to ensure a minimum level of
financing for every district and (2) because, even if the system were
a classification based on wealth, it was de facto and not de jure. With
reference to the first proposition the California court clearly displayed
what some have referred to as a "special judicial hostility towards
official discrimination, be it de jure or de facto, according to pecuniary
circumstance." 2 1 The effect of such hostility is that whenever a suspect
classification encroaches on a fundamental interest, a "constitutional
2
tilt sign flickers... suggesting a super-likelihood of invalidity."3
The effect in Serrano was to displace the traditional presumption
of reasonableness of a tax classification with a standard demanding a
"compelling state interest" to justify the enactment. The court cited
several Supreme Court cases as authority for the proposition that
classifications based on wealth are suspect.33 A review of the cited
cases indicates that they fall into two categories: those where wealth
was linked with voting rights and those where wealth was linked with
criminal procedural issues. It is uncertain whether the Supreme Court
regards wealth classifications per se as suspect or whether it regards
them as suspect when linked with voting and criminal procedure
issues. The tradition of the court's deference to states in the property
tax system of school financing suggests that wealth in isolation may not
be suspect. Since Serrano holds that wealth per se is suspect, it, in
essence, departs from tradition and ventures into a completely new
area.

In discussing the second proposition the court stated that education
is a major determination to one's chances for economic success and
31 Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 19 (1969-1970).
32 Id.
33
Tate v. Short, 39 U.S.L. Week 4301 (U.S. March 2, 1971); Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Anders v.
California, 886 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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that it exerts a strong influence on a child's development and future
role in modem society. The court noted Brown v. Board of Education3 4
as an example of the "significance of learning" and also drew an
analogy between the fundamental rights of education and those discussed in the voting rights cases.
In addition the court distinguished the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Mclnnis v. Ogilvie8 5 which had upheld a state's financing
education through property taxes. In that case the plaintiff asserted
that the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment could be satisfied only by a financing system that apportioned public funds according to the educational needs of students.
A three judge district panel held that no cause of action was stated
because: (1) the fourteenth amendment does not require that public
school expenditures be made only on the basis of educational needs,
and (2) the lack of a judicially manageable standard made the controversy nonjusticiable. In holding the strict scrutiny standard of review
inapplicable, the court upheld the financing scheme. Serrano was distinguishable because (1) it does not allege that the only way to satisfy
the fourteenth amendment was on the basis of educational needs and
(2) there is a judicially manageable principle in the allegation that
education based on wealth is unconstitutional.
Having established the position that classifications based on wealth
are suspect and that education is a fundamental interest, the court
reviewed the California school financing laws. In its analysis, the court
cited several Supreme Court cases as supportive of its decision. However, these cases are distinguishable from Serranoin that the Supreme
Court applied the constitutional tests, relied on by the Serrano court,
in a restrictive manner, focusing on the wording of the statute. The
Serrano court included in its analysis the results of applying a statute
that on its face did not involve wealth classifications. An example of
the Supreme Court's more restrictive approach is clearly demonstrated
in McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners,38 where the Court
examined a statute that extended absentee voting rights to four
classes of people. Therein the plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged
the act on the theory that by omitting any absentee voting privileges
for those imprisoned out of their county the statute was a classification
that impinged on a fundamental interest. The claim was that, as
written, the statute impinged on fundamental rights. In Williams v.
Illinois87 the Court struck down a state statute which provided that one
84 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
30394 U.S. 802 (1969).
37399 U.S. 235 (1970).
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unable to pay a fine should be imprisoned until he worked off the
amount due. In Roberts v. LaVallee38 the plaintiff successfully attacked
a New York statute that required one to pay a fee before receiving a
40
8 9 Douglas v. California,
court transcript. In Anders v. California,
Smith v. Bennett,41 Griffin v. Illinois,4 2 Harperv. Virginia State Board

of Electors,43 Tate v. Short,44 and Burns v. Ohio,4 5 the Supreme Court
similarly invalidated state acts where classifications based on wealth
impinged on fundamental rights. All of these cases however differ
from Serrano in that they focus on the wording of the statute, not the
result of applying the statute. In those cases the statute or procedure
on its face was clearly a classification that affected an established
fundamental interest. In Serrano, however, the California system of
financing public schools does not on its face classify by wealth. Differences in revenue obtained under this system resulted from applying
the California law. In addition the difference in revenue in any given
district is fortuitous and changes over a period of years. Districts that
are presently affluent were perhaps once poor. This distinction is
neither idle nor academic. If an enactment is suspect because the result
produces greater revenue in one area than that produced in other
areas, many presently sanctioned practices are similarly open to attack.
To label all such matters suspect would undermine traditional federal
deference to states in a variety of situations.
II.

BEYOND

SEmuANo

A. National Consequences
If the analysis of the California Supreme Court in Serrano is accepted, the consequences for other states are substantial and should
be felt in the near future. Even if review by the Supreme Court is
not sought, the Serrano reasoning should have a very persuasive effect
in similar suits in other states. Such suits are now pending in Florida,
Michigan, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin. In addition, other suits
are either ready or nearly ready in New York, Georgia, Ohio, and
North Carolina. 40 Serrano will be especially persuasive in litigation in
88 389 U.S. 40 (1967).

89386 U.S. 738 (1967).
U.S. 353 (1963).
41365 U.S. 708 (1961).
42351 U.S. 12 (1956).
44383 U.S. 663 (1966).
4439 U.S.L.W. 4301 (U.S. March 2, 1971).
40 372

45

360 U.S. 252 (1959).

46 Courier Journal, Aug. 31, 1971, § A, at 14. The following news item may
evidence a belief of some federal officials that the Serrano decision has broader
(Continued on next page)
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other states because it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish that case on its facts. Every state, with the exception of
Hawaii, whose educational system is entirely state financed, has a
similar system of local collections with a superimposed second system
of state assistance.47 The proportion of state aid varies widely as does
the means for determining how it will be administered, but the end
result of these systems with the exception of Hawaii, is more or less
similar to the California system attacked in Serrano.
A brief description of the type of systems used throughout the
United States illustrates the nationwide implications of Serrano. In
terms of its effect upon the impact of wealth differentials (difference
between the aggregate value of property taxable for school purposes)
between districts, there are basically three forms of state aid to educa-

tion:
(1) Equalizing (state aid reduces the impact of wealth differentials between districts.)
(2) Non-Equalizing (state aid has no effect on the impact of
wealth differentials between districts.)
(3) Anti-Equalizing (state aid intensifies the impact of wealth
differentials between districts.) 48

Furthermore, with respect to the classification of the administrationof
state aid, there are four systems: (1) Flat grant, (2) Foundation plan,
49
(3) Combination plan, and (4) Percentage equalizing.
Flat Grant

The Flat Grant is a system under which a specified amount of
money is paid by the state to each district per pupil or other unit of

measurement, such as classroom unit. The flat grant is normally non(Footnote continued from preceding page)

implications as to differentials in educational offering between states due to their
relative wealth rather than just differentials between districts within the same
state:
A national tax for schools was endorsed by HEW Secretary Richardson
after Nixon met for more than an hour with representatives of nine
elementary and secondary school organizations. Richardson said Nixon
ordered federal education officials to reexamine the role of the local
property tax in public school financing in light of a California Supreme
Court decision that it is unconstitutional. Richardson didn't indicate
what form a "more broadly based national tax" might take, or whether
Nixon committed himself to such a plan during the meeting.
The 4Wall
Street Journal, Oct., 1971 at 1, col. 3.
7
Coons, Chine, & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State FinancialStructures, 57 CAliw. L. REv. 305, 312 (1969).
48 Id.
49

at 313.

Coons, Clune, and Sugarman analyze state aid systems as being basically
three: flat grant, foundation plan, and percentage equalizing. They note, however, that many states employ a variation consisting of foudation plans and fiat
grants combined which they call combination plans. Id.
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equalizing but it could tend to be equalizing or anti-equalizing if the
source of the state funds was, respectively, a strongly progressive or
regressive income tax. If the grant was very large, it could subsume
local aspirations to provide for education and thus tend to be
equalizing. Such a grant is anti-equalizing if it is given on the basis
of a revenue unit such as "per teacher hired" since wealthier districts
can hire more teachers.5 o
FoundationPlan
The Foundation Plan is essentially a system under which a state
guarantees to the school district that if the district taxes itself at a
specified minimum rate, the state will insure that the district will
have a specified number of dollars available per pupil or per other
unit of measurement. Foundation plans tend to be equalizing to an
extent but they can never eliminate the effect of wealth disparity. 51
As between a wealthy district and a poor one, if the amount of money
per pupil guaranteed by the state and the minimum qualifying taxing
rate are set in such a manner that the wealthy district raises more
revenue locally than the state guarantees (and thus receives no funds
from the state) and the poor district raises less revenue than the state
guarantees, the state fund paid to the poor district is equalizing,
though it does not result in equality. It does not result in equality
because the poor district will only receive enough funds from the
state to increase its revenue to the state guaranteed minimum amount
per pupil and the wealthy district will have exceeded that amount
through locally raised revenue.
If, on the other hand, the state guarantee and the minimum qualifying taxing rate are set so that the wealthy district also raises less
revenue than the state guarantees, the state funds paid to the poor
district are equalizing only up to the amount of revenue that the
wealthy district raised by its own local taxation. Beyond that point,
the state fund is given to each district without regard to wealth
variations and is thus non-equalizing. As one authority points out,
even where all the state aid is equalizing, a foundation plan cannot
achieve full equalization because above the level guaranteed as a
"foundation" by the state, equal local efforts produce revenue directly
proportional to the wealth of the district, thus less effort is required
of the wealthy district than of the poor district to offer the same
financial level of educational offering above the foundation level.5 2
5o Id. at 313-14.
51 Id. at 314-15.
52 Id. at 315,

Norxs
CombinationPlan
A Combination Plan is a plan made up of both a flat grant and a
foundation plan and commonly employed in one of two ways. Under
one method the flat grant is simply added to whatever foundation
money is due a district [under this method the flat grant may be
equalizing, or anti-equalizing depending upon other circumstances
as explained above in the discussion of the flat grant.] In the second
method the flat grant is first added to the local revenue effort to
determine the foundation funds to which the district is entitled. The
effect of the second form is that districts poor enough to receive
foundation funds at least equal to the flat grant receive the same
amount of state aid they would have received through the foundation
plan if there was not flat grant. But the districts which are wealthy
enough not to qualify for foundation money still receive the entire flat
grant Commentors characterize this system as "a subsidy for the
wealthy only and ... grossly anti-equalizing."53 It should be noted
that the latter version of the system just described is the California
system dealt with in Serrano.
Percentage Equalizing
Percentage equalizing is a plan which, supposedly, fully equalizes
the wealth differentials among districts by state support of the district
budget in inverse proportion to the district's relative wealth. To use
the example given by commentators, if the poorest district in a state
had one tenth the wealth of the wealthiest district, the state would
support 90 percent of the poor district's budget while giving no support
to the wealthy district. Unfortunately, there are no states which use
this system in its purest form. Those states which claim to use the
system have added refinements which have destroyed its equalizing
effects.5 4
It is not necessary to speak of the effects of the above described
systems in purely theoretical terms because there has been at least
one recent empirical study conducted concerning the systems of
eight states, with an analysis of the taxing and spending data of six
of these states to determine their effects.5 5 The conclusions of that
study were summarized as follows:
53

Id.

5 Id. at 316.
55 The systems of Ohio, Nevada, Arizona, Illinois, Utah, New York, and
Rhode Island were studied and taxing and spending data for the first six states
were analyzed. J. CooNs, W. CLUNt,
& S. SUGARIMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH Ar
PuBLIc EDucA'nom (1970).
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(1) Poorer districts in general tend to make a greater tax effort
for education than do wealthier districts.
(2) Poorer districts in general have significantly lower educational
offerings than do wealthier districts.56

B. Consequences in Kentucky
Having now taken a broad look at the systems in use throughout
the country and found that none currently in use completely equalize
the wealth differentials between school districts and that some systems
in use actually exacerbate the wealth differentials, an examination of
the system used in Kentucky should now be given with regard to its
vulnerability to the reasoning of the Serrano decision. We begin with
the proposition that the major source of local tax support of education
is the property tax.57 As an example, for the 1967-68 school year, total
revenue from local sources was approximately $87 million, of which
approximately $67 million was from the general property tax. 8 Local
tax support in turn makes up a substantial percentage of the total
financial support of education in Kentucky. As an example, for the
1969-70 fiscal year, locally generated revenue made up approximately
33.3 percent of the total financial support of education in the state, as
compared with 51.7 percent from state funds and 15.0 percent from
Federal funds.50 Thus, it is clear that unless state aid is administered
in a manner that equalizes the differentials in wealth between districts
within the state, the Kentucky system is susceptible to the successful
attack made against the California system. Thus, it is necessary to
examine Kentucky's state system of financial support of education and
to determine what the effects of state aid are in order to evaluate the
Kentucky system's vulnerability to a Serrano type of attack.
No description of the collection of revenue from property tax
sources can be comprehended without first mentioning a relatively
recent, and traumatic, decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
and the aftermath of that decision. In Russman v. Luckett,60 the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that the existing policy of flagrant
violation of section 172 of the Kentucky Constitution, and implementing statutes,6' requiring that property be assessed at fair cash value
be ended. Since the average county assessment ratio (ratio of assessed
r 6 Coons, supra note 47, at 317.
57
Lynch, Tax Support of Education in Kentucky (Study by Spindletop
Research for Ky. Dept. of Education) (Jan. 1970).
58 1967-68 Ky. Pumnic ScxooL STATISTIcs 26.
5o 1969-70 ecEm-rs AN Ex, ENrrmws 2.
60 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965).
61
Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 132.450(1), 133.150 (Baldwins 1970).
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value to market value) was approximately 26 percent in 1965,62 it was
obvious that if the assessment on all property was increased to 100
percent of market value and tax rates were allowed to remain the same,
the property tax burden would be drastically increased. Therefore, a
special session of the Kentucky General Assembly was called in 1965
and that session enacted legislation commonly known as the "roll
back" law which was designed to cause adjustment of tax rates
downward in proportion to the increase in assessments.6 3 The legislation, somewhat simplified, provided in effect that for 1966 and thereafter the tax rate in each county should be such that it produced the
same revenue as was produced in 1965. The authorized tax rate in
each county was defined as that rate which, when applied to the 1966
assessment of property subject to taxation for the 1965 tax year, would
produce revenue approximately equal to the amount produced in
1965.64 This legislation is important to a discussion of property taxes
for school purposes because those taxes are affected by the "roll back"
provisions the same as all other property taxes. As will be discussed
later, this has had some rather strange effects on the equality of the
educational offering of the various school districts within the state.
As indicated above, the property tax is the major local source of
support for education. The property tax for school purposes consists
of three types of levies: a basic general-fund levy and two levies which
must be approved by the voters of a district.
The general-fund levy is authorized under Kentucky Revised
Statutes [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 160.47065 which provides that
the district board of education must submit a budget which does not
require more revenue from local property taxes than would have been
produced by application of the preceding year's tax rate to the preceding year's assessment, excluding voted levies and net assessment
growth. 66 Here we see the first example of the pervasiveness of the
"roll back" legislation. The only exception to the "roll back" limitation
on the district's budget is that a district can always levy at such tax
rate as is necessary to generate the amount of revenue needed to meet
the local tax effort required for participation in the state foundation
program, which will be discussed later. 67 Other than this exception,
62 1964-65 Ky. DEPT. OF REVENUE ANNuAL RIEP. 30.
63
64 Ky. Acrs, ch. 2 (1965).

This rate is known as the "compensating tax rate." KRS § 132.010
(Baldwin's 1970).
65K11S
§ 160.470 (Baldwin's 1970).
66
Net assessment growth is the net difference in the total valuation of
property subject to taxation in the preceding year and the total valuation of such
property m the current year. KRS § 132.425 (Baldwins 1970).
67KRS § 157.380 (Baldwin's 1970).
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the district must levy at a rate which will not generate more revenue
than that required by the "rolled back" budget.
The second local property tax for school purposes is a special
building fund levy authorized by KRS § 160.477.68 This levy must be
approved by the voters of the district and its rate must not be less than
5 cents and not more than 50 cents for each $100 of property subject
to local taxation. It is in addition to the maximum general-fund levy
previously discussed but it is limited to the compensating tax rate. 69
The third tax for school purposes which a school district must
choose to levy is an extra general-fund levy authorized by KRS §
157.44070 which provides that a district may exceed the maximum
provided by the general-fund levy if the voters of the district approve
of the additional tax. It is particularly important to note that this tax
is not subject to the compensating tax rate or any other "roll back"
restrictions. This provision is the only local avenue available to the
school districts to increase the level of educational offering. This provision appears to have been the only reason for the Kentucky Court of
Appeals to find that the "roll back" restrictions in KRS § 160.47071
were not contrary to section 172 of the Kentucky Constitution, which
provides that all property be assessed at fair cash value. 72 There is
a ceiling, however, even to this particular avenue of increasing local
tax revenue as it appears that this provision must be subordinated to
the statutory restriction of KRS § 160.47573 which provides that a tax
levy for school purposes must not exceed $1.50 for each $100 of
property subject to local taxation.
Having examined the means by which districts may generate
revenue locally, let us consider how the state administers state aid and
specifically, whether it is administered in a manner which equalizes
the wealth differentials between districts. Kentucky calls its system a
foundation program and the following brief recital of the General
Assembly's intent in enacting the foundation program legislation tells
a great deal about the application of the program:
68KRS § 160.477 (Baldwin's 1970).
69 See note 64, supra, and accompanying text.
7oKRS § 157.440 (Baldwin's 1970).

71
See note 65, supra, and accombanying text.
72
In Miller v. Nunnelley, 468 S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1971), it was contended
that the "roll back"' restrictions of KRS § 160.470 that provided that there could
be no levy which would produce more revenue than that produced in 1965 had
the practical effect of freezing the effective tax rates (actual tax rate mutiplied
by the 1965 assessment ratio) and thus perpetuating the unconstitutional
assessment ratios (unconstitutional because not 100 percent fair cash value).
The Court held, however, that the taxing power of the districts was unlimited
by virtue of the provision of KRS § 157.440 for a rate as high as the district
might by popular vote select.
73KRS § 160.475 (Baldwin's 1970).
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In KRS 157.310 to 157.440 and subsection (2) of 157.990, it is the
intention of the General Assembly to assure substantially equal
public school educational opportunities, through a foundation
program, for those in attendance in the public schools of the Commonwealth, but not to limit nor to prevent any school district from
providing educational services and facilities beyond those assured
by the foundation program; and to provide, as additional state
funds are made available for the public schools, for the use of such
funds for the further equalization of educational opportunities. 74

Close investigation of the foundation program reveals that the
program is in fact not a pure form of the foundation plan model,
previously discussed, 75 but is similar to the second form of the combination plan, also discussed above. 78 A district is eligible to participate in the program if it makes the required local tax effort,77
defined as the required amount of revenue to be provided by the
district from local tax revenue sources only.78 This amount is the
district's proportional part of the aggregate required local tax effort
for all school districts in the state,79 which in turn is based upon a
theoretical taxing effort by each district of $1.10 for each $100 of
property subject to tax for school purposes 0 for the 1965-66 year and
is increased each year by the net assessment growth.8 ' A district is
entitled to exceed the statute $1.50 tax rate ceiling 2 where necessary
to provide the required local tax effort.8 3
Once it has been determined that a district's local tax effort enables
it to qualify for participation in the state foundation program, a
determination is made as to the total cost of the foundation program
in that particular district. KRS § 157.390 provides that this determination will be made by adding the four following amounts:8
(1) The product of the number of teachers in the district multiplied by the salary set forth in the biennial budget for teachers of
various ranks,"' the number of teachers in the computation not to
exceed the number of class room units allowed the district by KRS
§ 157.360.86
74 KRS § 157.310 (Baldwin's 1970).
75

See notes 51 and 52, supra, and accompanying text.

76 See note 53, supra, and accompanying text.

77 KRS § 157.350(4) (Baldwin's 1970).
78 KBS § 157.320 (1) (Baldwin's 1970).
79 KRS § 157.380 (Baldwin's 1970).
80 Ky. ACTs, ch. 2, § 15 (1965).
81 KRS § 157.380 (Baldwin's 1970) and see note 66, supra, and accompanying

text for
82 definition of net assessment growth.

See note 73, supra, and accompanying text.
s30p.Ky. A-r'y GEN. 65-600 (1965).
84 KRS § 157.390 (Baldwin's 1970).
85 The statute classifies teachers in seven ranks based upon their education.
(Continued on next page)
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(2) The product of the budgeted amounts for current expenses
per class room unit multiplied by the number of classroom units.
(3) The product of budgeted amounts for capital outlay per
classroom unit multiplied by the number of classroom units.
(4) The product of the allowable transportation cost per pupil
87
per day, as determined by the superintendent of public instruction,
multiplied by the aggregate attendance of transported children.
The required local tax effort is deducted from the sum of the above
four amounts and the remainder is the amount distributable to the
district from the state foundation fund unless the distributable amount
is less than $243 per pupil in average daily attendance for the 1970-71
school year or less than $247 for school years thereafter. If the amount
is less, the amount distributable from the state fund is increased by
the amount necessary to make the state distribution equal $243, respectively, per pupil in average daily attendance.88 Thus the Kentucky
system of state aid is, from the standpoint of equalization, very similar
to the California system.8 9
While the Kentucky statutes rationalize the system as a foundation
plan, it would only be a pure foundation plan if it guaranteed a total
amount per pupil for each district to spend rather than guaranteeing
that each district will receive at least a certain amount from the state
fund. The effect of the system is that even the districts which are
wealthy enough that their local tax effort equals or exceeds the total
cost of the foundation program [sum of (1), (2), (3), and (4) above
minus the required local tax effort] will receive the $243 ($247) per
pupil minimum. At the same time, the district which is poor enough
that the total cost of the foundation program is at least $243 ($247)
per pupil will receive the same amount it would have received if the
provision guaranteeing $243 ($247) as the amount distributable from
the state fund had never been enacted. Thus only the wealthier districts benefit from this provision and it is therefore anti-equalizing
whether the system is called a foundation plan, combination plan, or
whatever.
Another aspect of the system in Kentucky which is especially
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

KRS § 157.390(1)(a) (Baldwin's 1970).
86 The statute provides for the allotment of classroom units for elementary
and secondary schools; vocational education; special instructional services for
exceptional children; superintendents, principals and their assistants- and special
instructional personnel. E.g., for elementary and secondary schools, one classroom unit is allocated for each 27 pupils in average daily attendance. KRS §
157.360 (Baldwin's 1970).
87
KRS § 157.370 (Baldwin's 1970).
8 8
1MS § 157.400 (Baldwin's 1970).
S89 See note.53, supra, and accompanying text.
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pernicious is that of the "roll back" provisions described above. 0 These
provisions effectively prohibit any district from raising the level of its
educational offering by employing a higher taxing rate to produce
more local revenue for school use. While it is true that KRS § 157.44011
is an exception to the "roll back" provisions and allows a district to
vote itself a higher tax rate, current public attitude toward tax increases
makes this particular provision a hollow promise. Thus districts are
effectively saddled with a tax rate from prior years which insures
that the educational offering of the poorer districts will not be improved
by an increased local tax effort.
The Serrano decision was primarily concerned with the effec of
the state system of educational support and not the mechanics of its
operation. Obviously any detailed analysis of empirical data to
determine the effects of the Kentucky system is beyond the scope of
this article. However, it might be interesting to note some examples of
the system's more noticeable effects by comparing two Kentucky
school districts on opposite ends of the wealth spectrum.
Leslie County School District had an estimated per capita income
in 1968 of $892092 and an assessed valuation of $7180 per child.9 3 The
district expended $309.56 per pupil in average daily attendance during
the 1967-68 school year.94 During the same period of time, the Jefferson
County School District, which had an estimated per capita income of
$35475 and an assessed valuation of $34,095 per child,96 expended
$461.67 per pupil.9 7 The reason for the disparity appears to be due to
the system of educational support which relies heavily on locally produced revenue from property taxes.
Leslie County was taxing at an effective rate of .467 percent98 and
Jefferson County was taxing at an effective rate of 1.047 percent. 9
Both districts qualified for participation in the state foundation program by virtue of their local tax effort. The total cost of the foundation
program in Leslie County, and thus the amount distributable by the
state to the district, was approximately $96,856,875100 which, when
90

See notes 60-64, supra, and accompanying text.

91 See note 70, supra, and accompanying text.
92 1967-68 KY. PUBLIC SCHOOL STATISTICS 5 (1968).
93 1969-70 PUBLIC SCHOOL FnANCiAL AN.LYSrS 29 (1970).
04 1970 PNosn.Es OF Ky. PUBLIC SCHooLs 9 (1970).
95 1967-68 Ky. PUBLC SCHooL STATISTICS 5 (1968).
90 1969-70 PUBLIC SCHOOL FXNANCIL ANALYSIS 24 (1970).
97 1970 PROFmLES OF Ky. PUriC SCHooLs 9 (1970).
08 1969-70 PULC SCHOOL FNANcrAL ANALYSIS 29 (1970).
991969-70 PUBuc SCHOOL FINANc AL. ANALYSIS 24 (1970).
10 This figure was determined by subtracting the required local effort from
he total state allotment for the foundation program in the district 1968 FOuNDA7ON PnocBAtf ExPrwrroENs BY CATECORY 26 (1968) and 1969-70 PUBLIC
CHOOL FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 29 (1970).
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divided by the number of pupils (3566.1),101 equals an amount much
greater than $243. However, the amount distributable to Jefferson
County was $7,237,317102 which, when divided by the number of

students (77454.1),103 equals approximately $93-thus necessitating increasing the amount distributable from the state fund by approximately
$150 to make the state distribution equal $243 per pupil as provided
by KRS § 157.400.0 4 This then is an actual case of the economic gap
being widened rather than narrowed by the system.
Few persons would argue that quality of the academic offering is
determined only by the amount of money spent on education by a
district, but most would agree that it is one of the most substantial
factors. It is interesting to note that statistics such as the following
from the two districts discussed above seem to reinforce the argument
in Serrano that there is a close relationship between the wealth of a
district, money spent on education by a district, and the educational
offering of that district:

Average Annual Salaries for Classroom Teachers
Percentage of Teachers with Masters or Higher
Cost per Pupil for Instruction
Cost per Pupil for Educational Supplies & Books
Percentage of High School Graduates Entering
College

Jefferson
County
$6,991
25.23
$377.54
$12.83

Leslie
County
$4,991
10.00
$227.09
$.35

50.5

29.7105

It does not appear that any case in Kentucky has raised the Serrano
argument-that the state system for the support of education is a
discriminatory classification on the basis of wealth and touches on a
fundamental interest, education, and therefore violates the equal protection clauses of the Kentucky and federal constitutions.108 There
have been cases holding that statutes which, as a result of the system
of taxing and distribution of school funds, effected discriminatory
classification on the basis of race, thereby resulting in poorer schools
for one race, were void as being contrary to the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.10 7 It is only a slight jump from that fact
PMuc SCRHOOL FiINtAcL ANAL-isis 29 (1970).
102 This figure was determined by subtracting the required local effort from
the total state allotment for the foundation program in the district. 1968 FouNDATION PROGRAm Ex=Dmrruims BY CATEGORY 21 (1968).
10 1969-70 PuBic ScnooL FxNANeLcL ANAL-Ysis 24 (1970).
ioKRS § 157.400 (Baldwin's 1970).
1011969-70

105 1970 PROFILES OF Ky. PuBLic ScHooLS (1970).

amend XIV, § 1; Ky. CoNsT. § 3.
107 E.g., Claybrook v. City of Owensboro, 16 F. 297 (D. Ky. 1883).
106 U.S. CoNsT.
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situation to the situation of Serrano,where wealth of the district rather
than race is the prohibited classification. In any event, if and when
the Serrano argument is raised in Kentucky, the courts will have to
decide the question against the background of the Kentucky system
of property tax and state aid to education (which, due to the "roll
back" legislation, is probably more anti-equalizing than the California
system). Will the Kentucky Court of Appeals maintain the current
system of property tax as the major local source of support for education-even though its only recommendation is that it is a system with
which state and local officials are familiar? Or will the court, like the
California Supreme Court, force abandonment of this system, which
denies its citizens an equal educational opportunity? This is the
question that the Kentucky Court may soon be called upon to answer.
Jack G. Stephenson
RichardC. Stephenson

